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rrici g and Market Mix OptiUization
in Freight Transportation
We propose improved pricingand market mix can improve the profitability of the freight
transportationprovider through the reduction of equipment repositioningcosts. We hypothesize that because of complexattes surroundingpricingand equiment rehositaoningcosting,
existing pricingstrategiesin freight transportationfail to fully considerthese costs. We test this
hypothesis in an applied setting in which Monte Carlo simulation captures the stochasticity
of market conditions inherent in the problem. We use a heuristic to improve the nondifferentiable, discontinuousobjective function. Our results from test cases show with high confidence
that currentprices are not optimal, as indicated by a strong correlationbetween recommended increases and decreases in market prices and the internalizedrepositioningcosts. Our
hypothesis is further supported by a high confidence that the obtainedprofit level distribution is significantly (statistically) higher than the currentprofit levels.
by Michael F.Gorman

he objective of this paper is to evaluate
the hypothesis that an individual
freight transportation company tends
to implement pricing strategies that underrepresent the cost of empty equipment repositioning. By fully incorporating these costs
into pricing strategies, freight carriers can
vastly improve profitability in their network
of service offerings, or market mix, through
full consideration of equipment repositioning costs into their price offerings.
In order to test this theory, we propose an
approach that addresses the three key components of developing an integrated network
pricing strategy for a freight transportation
company.
(1) Regardless of market structure, market
demand conditions for each market in
the network must be observed.
(2) Nodal equipment imbalances and repositioning costs must enter into individual
loaded traffic market pricing and market
mix decisions.

(3) Market condition uncertainties over
future demand levels: and price sensitivity must be included in order to assure a
robust and useful model solution in an
applied setting.
The solution employs a heuristic, which
strives to maximize the nonlinear, discontinuous network profit function. The heuristic
considers market conditions for all markets
in the network and fully incorporates repositioning costs into pricing decisions through
incorporating a transportation problem into
the network profit function. To account for
uncertainties in the product markets, we ran
Monte Carlo simulations of the demand
conditions to gain a level of confidence in the
model solutions and to test them for sensitivity to changing market conditions.
We find that in our test cases in intermodal rail, a focus on the profitability of
individual markets leads to pricing behavior
that treats empty equipment repositioning
costs as an externality, suboptimizing the
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network. If these costs are in fact externalities to the product pricing decision, internalizing these costs into the pricing decision
leads to greater network-wide profitability.
As the costs of repositioning are considered,
some markets prices are discounted while
others are raised to achieve a better-balanced
network. Statistical tests of the change in
profit levels and correlation of recommended
price changes with externalities show support for our hypothesis.

FREIGHT PRICING
Freight transportation provides the service of
moving goods between numerous geographic locations, which are identified as origindestination pairs. A directed arc connecting
an origin and destination node in a network
diagram represents a freight market (or
product) that is characterized by a price and
quantity as governed by the demand conditions facing the firm. The number of markets
a freight transportation company participates in and the quantities offered in each of
those markets measures its market mix.
When the difference of the sum of the
quantities in inbound and outbound markets
at a location does not equal zero, the equipment used in providing transport becomes
unbalanced in the network and costly equipment repositioning must rebalance the network. Thus, the market mix impacts the cost
structure for the transportation company
through equipment repositioning costs the
transportation company must incur to rebalance its equipment. An enlightened transportation company would recognize and try
to encourage markets that reduce this cost
and discourage business that increases this
cost to the extent these markets are profitable.
Despite this relationship, pricing decisions
are often limited to a market (arc) focus,
ignoring or discounting equipment imbalances and repositioning requirements which
exist by location (node). While the direct
136

costs of the market (such as fuel and crew)
affect market profitability in a clear way,
node imbalances affect individual market's
network-level profitability through complicated interactions with other markets. Thus,
the total cost of repositioning is neither fully
nor accurately included in pricing decisions
for individual markets, some markets are
more profitable than they would appear on
the surface, while others are less so. In economic terms, repositioning is a positive or
negative externality to each individual market, but a fully internalized cost in the network of products provided by the transportation company.
Taking a network pricing perspective on
product pricing is a daunting challenge. The
best way to address a costly imbalance at a
particular location in the network depends
on both the market conditions for all markets in and out of that node as well as the
imbalances at locations adjoined by the markets (which are themselves affected by all
markets they face). Because numerous markets affect the imbalance at each location,
and each of the markets affects two locations
in the network, it is difficult to effectively
identify the best markets for price changes
to maximize the profitability of the network.
Further, as market conditions change continuously, the network should be regularly
reevaluated for pricing opportunities. The
speed of price publication and proliferation
of spot-market pricing made possible by the
Internet makes the ability to create on-the-fly
precision pricing with a network wide perspective all the more pressing.

LITERATURE REVIEW
No work has been published based on intrafirm externalities in pricing transportation
products, but work from related areas
applies to some aspects of the problem.
Considerable work has taken place in the
area of rail equipment repositioning, as in
Crainic, et al. (1993). It is important to note
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that this work focuses on pricing strategies
to reduce network imbalances and required
repositioning (equipment imbalances), not
optimal repositioning strategies given those
imbalances.
The most prolific publishing in the literature on interrelated markets deals with the
interactions of numerous product markets.
Samuelson (1952) provides a general framework to spatial price equilibrium in numerous markets. It accurately argues proper
analysis requires a multi-market view. Dafermos and Nagurney (1989) introduce spatial
separation to network market models with
fixed transportation costs. It focuses on the
shipper's multiple products rather than the
multiple transportation products provided
by the carrier, as is the case here.
Hurley and Peterson (1994) and Friesz,
Gottfied and Morlok (1986) discuss optimal
freight market pricing from the carrier's perspective. These works concentrate on the
shipper-carrier relationship given the
impacts of large shippers and the optimal
setting of volume price breaks in an oligopolistic setting. This study differs in that it
assumes the carrier sets price on a marketwide basis, not by individual shipper, as is
the case when a large number of small shippers make up the market. This study
includes inter-carrier interaction only insofar
as it is represented by the demand curve facing the carrier; it is concerned with characterizing intra-carrier multiple product interactions.
Other studies have considered multiple
product interactions within the firm. Beije
and Groenwege (1992) lead, a qualitative
discussion of the inadequacy of single-market analysis when multiple products are usually produced by a firm in cooperation with
a number of suppliers facing an array of
input and output market conditions. Dillon
and Roberts (1993) provide an empirical
analysis of cross-product input market
impacts in the agriculture industry, which
estimates the interrelationships of input and

output markets. Both of these studies only
characterize firm behavior; neither presents a
quantitative, prescriptive model for optimal
behavior for a firm producing multiple interrelated markets.

PROBLEM DESCRIPTION:
The firm's objective is to maximize network
profit (fin) across all markets Mijk:
(1) IIn = ijZk(TRijk - TCijk) - Zk(TRCk),
where i and j are indexes for origin and destination nodes in the network, and k is an
index for equipment type. Any particular
node in the network can act as either an origin or a destination for a market or both.
We assume the firm faces a downwardsloping demand curve, and thus has some
price-setting capability. The quantity sold in
each market, qijk, is given by

(2)

lUik -Lpk,

NU k, £ ilk).

where Pijk is the price charged in the market which is driven by £ ijk, the price elasticity of demand facing the firm in the market.
l,ijk represents any number of exogenous
demand-shift variables.
We experimented with numerous functional forms for the potential demand curve
facing the firm, including constant slope (linear), constant elasticity (log linear), and
kinked at the current market price (non-linear). The search methodology performance
was unaffected by the functional form of the
demand curve. In both the stylized example
and the case study presented below, we
found the linear demand curve represented
the problem well and suited our needs.
We assume the firm does not price discriminate and charges only one price for all
units shipped in a market such that total revenue, TR, is the product of price, p, and
quantity, q, in each market. To the extent
that some price discrimination may be possi137
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ble, Pijk may be interpreted as the mean of
the prices charged in a market without
affecting model validity.
Let the total cost function be represented
by xV(qijk). The model allows for any nondecreasing total cost function. We tested
quadratic (increasing marginal costs), linear

The market quantities directly impact the
repositioning flows, R:jk, the total repositioning costs, TRC, and thus the network profitability function.
When repositioning costs are introduced

(constant marginal costs), and nonlinear

into the profit function, they are no longer

(discontinuous costs based on discrete, trainlevel volumes of service), and hard capacity
constraints. Because the search methodology makes no assumptions on functional
form, instead evaluating improvement computationally, it is unaffected by the choice.
For simplicity, we use a linear total cost function for our stylized example. We found a
constant marginal cost function in our case
study adequately depicted the cost of service
in the quantity ranges under consideration in
the case study.
Thus, given demand curve and cost functions, the direct market profit disregarding
network repositioning is given by:
(3)

II iJk=Pijk*qijkj -- (4ijk)

COST ALLOCATION
In order to determine total network repositioning costs and allocate them across markets, a classic transportation problem is
solved to address all imbalances in a way
that minimizes Total Repositioning Cost
(TRC) and to determine the total network
repositioning costs.
(4) TRC = kMin TRCk = Zk7iZj RCijk Rijk
subject to EjRijk - EjRjik = Iik

for all j.

Where the imbalance I at a node i for equipment type k (lik) is equal to the difference
between the total market flows into (qjik)
and out of (qijk) the node i for each equipment type, k.

138

(5)

Iik = Zjqjik - zjqijk

for all k.

external to the individual market profit function and the total service costs become interdependent. They are tied through the
required repositioning implied by imbalances
at the nodes, Iik, in the network. The network transportation problem is solved for all
surpluses and deficits in the network and the
total repositioning costs are subtracted from
the profits of the individual markets. Optimal prices cannot be derived by analytical
methods that cannot capture the complicated
cost interdependencies across markets that
arise from repositioning. At the boundaries
of dual sensitivity ranges, marginal costs are
discontinuous and total costs are nondifferentiable. Thus, other methods must be used
to find optimal prices.
The dual values, Dik, on the balance constraints in the transportation problem indicate the dollar value of reducing or expanding a surplus or deficit at a single location in
the network. For a market, which affects two
locations in the network, the Marginal
Externality Cost, MECijk, of an additional
unit moved is difference of the duals between
origin and destination nodes in the market:
(6)

MECijk = Dik-Djk.

The MEC indicates the relative dollar value
of equipment at each location. A positive
MECijk indicates an equipment move to a
more desirable location, and TRCk, is
reduced (a "bonus") through reduced repositioning; TRCk is increased if MECijk is
negative (a "penalty"). The network repositioning costs resulting from market quantities are internalized to individual markets
through the equation:
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(7)

II n ijk = TRijk - TCOjk + qijk *MECijk

Note that for each equipment type, k, all
repositioning costs are allocated to the various markets.
(8)

TRCk =YjiZjMECijk*qiJk

ALLOWING FOR DEMAND UNCERTAINTY
When testing our theory in an applied setting, we must account for the single most
ubiquitous form of pricing inefficiency, market demand uncertainty. Market uncertainty
affects pricing two ways. First, existing network price shortcomings may be a reflection
of market uncertainty that can create the
inability to price optimally. Second, reckless
pricing strategies that aggressively attempt to
reduce nodal imbalances could have highly
negative profitability impacts due to demand
uncertainty. Because of the nature of the
problem, the objective function has a sharp
peak at its optimum where the bonus
becomes a penalty (a change in sign of
MEC). For example, using price reductions
to reduce an equipment surplus at an origin
node could create a deficit at the origin
because of unpredictable customer behavior.
In this case the market profitability is hurt
two ways: through the lower market price
as well as the increased repositioning costs
into the origin that has become a deficit location. In order to have a fair comparison
against current pricing practices, and to
introduce market risks to the model search, it
is critical to search for potential price
improvements in the presence of market
uncertainties.
Two forms of demand uncertainty shroud
the successful application of the algorithm:
uncertainty of price elasticity of demand,
Sijk, (customer responsiveness to price
changes) and of shifts in demand, J'ijk,
(external economic impacts on the markets).
We found a trapezoidal, or truncated tri-

angular, distribution as depicted in Figure 1
best met our sampling needs for these variables. Within the expected range for demand
and elasticity levels, observations were distributed uniformly. Outside the expected
range, a linear degradation of probability of
occurrence is applied out to the best case and
worst case possibilities for each sampled variable.
We must estimate price elasticity of
demand to price effectively; however, the
responsiveness of customers to a change in
price is typically difficult at best to estimate.
Given the general lack of precision in price
elasticity estimates typically produced
through statistical methods (Tellis, 1988), we
develop a nonstatistical methodology which
is consistent with current market pricing
behavior (Gorman, 2000).
Pricing strategies that are not robust to
varying demand conditions are not useful in
an applied setting. We avoid relying on a single point estimate of elasticity of demand by
sampling Eijk as shown in Figure 2a (adapted
from Gorman, 2001). We ran the optimization routine multiple times, each from a different random draw from a distribution of
elasticity estimates to generate recommendations that hold for a wide range of customer price responsiveness.
Exogenous factors create shifts in the
demand curve that can upset pricing strategies geared towards maximizing profits by
managing nodal imbalances. To introduce the
market risk associated with demand shifts,
we conducted Monte Carlo sampling of the
'stochastic demand level, I1ijk, as shown in
Figure 2b. We sample demand shifts within
the search, producing a risk-adjusted measure
of expected profit for each market with each
iteration. Sampling from a distribution within the optimization module bases decisions
on expected values of the profit function, and
creates model output that is a distribution of
optimal prices under a wide variety of
demand conditions. We forego point solutions in favor of less precise but more robust
139
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Figure 1: Trapezoidal Probability Density Function Used for Demand Parameters
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recommendations based on the expected
value of the objective function.
In the stylized example presented below,
we did not perform any elasticity or demand
sampling for ease of illustration. In our case
study, sampling distributions for demand
shift and price elasticity sensitivity are based
on market study and expert opinion. For the
demand shift sampling, in order to be conservative we used double the range of actual
140
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market quantities experienced by BNSF for
the past four quarters. For the elasticity sampling, we used from one-half to two times
the point estimate generated from the
methodology in Gorman (2000). We validated this range with a survey of BNSF market
managers who were most familiar with these
markets. The sampling range employed
fully encompassed most survey responses
received.
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SOLUTION ALGORITHM
No standard method exists to solve the problem in equation (1) to optimality because of
the discontinuous, nondifferentiable profit
function with numerous local optima. Additionally, because of the combinatorial attributes of setting prices in multiple markets, the
problem size grows exponentially with the
number of markets. Thus, we focus on
quickly finding price improvements over
existing pricing strategies as evidence of the
presence of externalities, rather than search
for optimal prices. We found a heuristic for
finding price improvements was effective for
testing our hypothesis. We felt that more
exact and time-consuming search methods
were unwarranted given the uncertainty of
market demand parameters.
The algorithm uses a computational gradient technique to improve network prices.
Parameters to the search-the set of starting
prices IP'), the initial step size, Ap 0ijk, final
step size, Apmmnijk, and the rate of reduction
of the step size, a-are derived experimentally. We found solution speed and quality
to be negligibly affected by these parameters,
but the implications of the analysis hold
whatever the parameter choices. The quantity of sampling of elasticity and demand
shifts each affects model solution speed linearly; usually 10 samples of each were
enough to gain confidence the model was
producing regular and stable results in the
face of uncertainty.
Throughout the algorithm description,
the denotation" ' " indicates the value of the
variable set (P, Qt, D', p ijk, q'ijk, Ap' ijk,
AI'ijk) in the current iteration.
The algorithm proceeds as follows.
(1) For n sets of price elasticity samples:
(1.1) Sample market price elasticities, eiJk
for all markets under consideration.

(2) While Ap-iijk < Ap'ijk,
(2.1) Calculate the set of market quantities {Q'1. given the current best
set of {P'), as in equation (2).
(2.2) Calculate direct profits rlIjk given
the set of prices (P') and quantities
IQ') as in equation (3).
(2.3) Calculate imbalances Ii given
JQ'Ifor all nodes in the network as
in equation (8).
(2.4) Solve the total repositioning cost
linear program TRC as in equation
(4).
(2.5) Update the duals {D'I for all points
in the network as indicated by the
solution to TRC.
(2.6) Calculate the marginal externality
cost (MECijk) of all markets as in
equation (6).
(2.7) Calculate the network profits generated by each market (Il`ijk) as in
equation (7).
(2.8) For m samples of demand shift
parameter JijJk:
(2.8.1) Calculate q'ijk, for P'ijk =
P'ijk ± Ap i]k as in

equation (2).
(2.8.2) Generate expected change
in total market profit
estimates:
Arlnijk = ATRijk + AvECijk
* Aqijk
(9)

(2.9) Let P'ijk = P'ijk ± Ap'ijk, for Anrjk >

0. (Update value of P'ijk-)
(2.10) If Afl t n,jk <= 0 for all markets,
then AP'ijk = AP'ijk
value of AP'ijk-)

*

a.

(Update

(3) {P*l = {Pt} given this sample of Fjk. (Save
the current values of P'.)
(4) Save distribution of {P*I for all n samples of eijk.

(1.2) Set IP') = (PO); Set {Q'} = (Q01; Set
Ap' ijk = Ape ijk

141

TRANSPORTATION QUARTERLY/WINTER 2002

The algorithm returns a distribution of price
change recommendations tP*i and a distribution of expected profit levels given samples
from various market conditions (jjk and pijk)STYLIZED EXAMPLE
For pedagogical reasons, we adapted a simple
three-node, six-market, single equipment
type network adapted from Gorman (2001)
as shown in Figure 3 to demonstrate the concepts of this model. The network is solved
without sampling for ease of presentation.
In this network, the flows in the six product markets result in equipment deficits and
surpluses at the three end points which must
be balanced via equipment repositioning at
the transportation provider's expense. Table
2 shows the market profits from the customer moves, the corresponding repositioning costs, and the resulting network profits
before the optimization algorithm is applied
to the network. Table 2 also shows the corresponding steps in the algorithm that generate the calculated figures.

Based on the results of the empty repositioning linear program, TRC, dual values are
used to create MEC(O) (the initial value of
MEC given initial values in the network),
which is shown in Table 3. The initial step
size is set to APijk = $50 and a = .75. The
search stopped when APi]k < APminiIk = $1.
After 21 iterations of the algorithm on this
simple network without demand shift sampling (Step 2.8), the model finds no further
improvements in network profitability (Steps
2.9 and 2.10) and converges on the final
results in Table 3.
The total network profits in Table 3 and
the change in network profits in Table 4 both
demonstrate an opportunity to overcome the
resulting 6% reduction in market profit due
to price changes with an 85% reduction in
empty repositioning costs, resulting in a 23%
network profitability increase. The results
are particularly dramatic in this example
because of the small network, which allows
for few low-cost repositioning alternatives.
It is interesting to note that the FW-CH
market is originally priced as a negative-

Figure 3: Sampling Mllustrative Network

+350
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Table 1: Variable Glossary
Market Pricing Problem Variables:
i= Origin node index for any node in the network acting as an origin
j= Destination node index for any node in the network acting as a destination
k = Equipment type index
qijk = Total quantity shipped by the carrier in the market from i to k for equipment k
Pijk = Price charged in the market from i to j for equipment type k
fl'ijk = Direct profit associated with the market from i to j for equipment type k
ll'ijk= Network profit associated with a market, including repositioning cost impact
0
= Total network profit; equals the sum of rI ijk
TRijk = Total revenue generated from a market
TCijk = Total direct costs of a market
ln,

Repositioning Problem Variables:
TRCk = Total network repositioning cost
Rijk = Repositioning flow from node i to node j for equipment k
RCijk = Repositioning cost from node i to node j for equipment k
MECijk = Marginal externality cost of the last unit moved in a market, qijk
Dik = Dual of balance constraint at node i for equipment k
Iik = Imbalance at node i for equipment type k
Stochastic Demand Parameters:

I'ijk = Exogenous factors causing shifts in the demand curve of a single market
Sijk = Price elasticity of demand in a single market
Sampling Parameters:
m = Number of samples taken of ji in each iteration of each price search
n = Number of samples taken of E,also the number of price searches
Search Parameters:
a = Factor for reducing the step size of search in Pijk, 0 < a < 1
IP*) = Final set of recommended prices from price recommendation search
[PO) = Initial set of prices to start recommendation search
Ap0 i1 k = Initial step size in price search
AP'ijk = Minimum step size to be considered in price search

profitability move when looking at only the
direct market profit. The only rationale for
this pricing is to encourage additional volumes in this market to reduce surpluses
thereby reducing deficits at FW and CH. The
model does not suggest a change to this
price; rather, to address these imbalances it
shuts down the CH-FW market. Thus,
although repositioning costs had been
accounted for to some degree in initial pricing, correct incorporation of repositioning
costs into pricing decisions results in a large
impact on network-based pricing.

CASE STUDY RESULTS
We test our hypothesis in applications from
201 to 462 markets of six equipment types
in intermodal freight rail at Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railroad to test for the
presence of equipment repositioning externalities in an applied rail setting. The model
only applies to rail-controlled equipment,
for which railroads are responsible for
shouldering repositioning costs. (Shippers
manage and pay separately for the repositioning of privately owned fleets.) We
applied the problem to six of eight different
143
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Table 2: Starting Prices and Quantities for the Network in Figure 3
Step 1.1

Step 1.2

Step 2.1

Elasticity

Price

Quantity,

Cost/Load

Market Profit

CH-LA

7.5

$1,200

900

$650

$495,000

LA-CH

4.0

$750

650

$650

$65,000

CH-FW

2.3

$600

300

$500

$30,000

FW-CH

6.0

$350

50

$500

($7,500)

FW-LA

3.4

$850

200

$600

$50,000

LA-FW

7.0

$700

300

$600

$30,000

Market

Total:

Step 2.2

2,400

$662,500

Step 2.3

Network Imbalance:

CH -500

FW +150

LA + 350

Step 2.4

Repositioning

Quantity

Cost/Empty

Total Repo Cost

LA-CH

150

$500

$75,000

FW-CH

350

$300

$105,000

Total Repositioning,

500
CH +300

$180,000

Step 2.5

Dual Values:

FW -300

Step 2.7

Total Network Profit: (Market Profit - Total Repositioning)

LA -500
S482,500

Table 3: Final Network Prices and Quantities
Step 2.6

Step 3.

MECCO)

Price

Quantity

Cost/Load

Market Profit

CH-LA

$800

$1,211

866

$650

$485,826

LA-CH

($800)

$738

723

$650

$63,624

CH-FW

$600

$700

0

$500

FW-CH

($600)

$350

50

$500

($7,500)

FW-LA

$200

$861

190

$600

$49,590

LA-FW

($200)

$689

333

$600

$29,637

Market

Total
Repositioning

-

2,162

$0

$621,177

Quantity

Cost/Empty

LA-CH

0

$500

$0

FW-CH

93

$300

$27,900

Total Repositioning

93

Total Network Profit:

144

Total Repo Cost

$27,900
S593,277
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Table 4: Change in Network Prices and Quantities
Market

Price

Quantity

Market Profit

Price/MEC(O)

CH-LA

$11

(34)

($9,174)

1.4%

7g

tl .

LAt-CU

_______

1.5Yo__

CH-FW

$100

(300)

($30,000)

16.7%

FW-CH

$0

0

$0

0.0%

FW-LA

$11

(10)

($410)

5.5%

LA-FW

($11)

33

($363)

5.5%

Total

238

($41,323)

5.1%

LA-CH

(150)

($75,000)

FW-CH

(257)

($77,100)

Total Repositioning

(407)

($152,100)

Total Network Profit

intermodal equipment types, which are vans
and containers of different lengths.
The initial prices and quantities are set to
current market conditions. The initial step
size is set to APijk = $50 and a = .75. The
search stopped when APijk < APijk = $1. The
demand shift parameter, Jijk, is sampled for
m=30 times for each price change; price recommendations are based on sampling for
n=30 different .pjk
elasticity draws. As a test,
we ran the model with other search parameters and found similar results.
Precise optimization in this setting cannot
be assured nor was aspired to, given market
uncertainties. Our objective was to find high
confidence of improved pricing strategies
despite market uncertainty, as evidence that
repositioning costs are external to individual
market pricing within the transportation
firm.
The solution algorithm produced intuitively plausible solutions for both nodal
imbalances as well as market prices. While
creating a more balanced network, no rec-

S110,777

ommended market price changes generate an
expected reversal of a nodal imbalance. The
introduction of uncertainty of demand to the
solution algorithm creates high costs of
aggressive attempts to balance the network,
driving a risk-averse behavior in the price
search that reduces the likelihood of overly
aggressive pricing. We found individual market price recommendations to be plausible.
For example, no corner solutions (such as
market shut down) are generated, primarily
due to the quadratic nature underlying the
profit function.
Our hypothesis is that equipment repositioning costs are an externality, or are underrepresented, in current prices. We tested this
hypothesis in two ways. First, we looked at
the correlation of MEC and recommended
price changes. A positive correlation is evidence that these costs are not fully reflected in
current pricing. Second, we looked at the distribution of revised profit levels after recommended prices are implemented. If a' high
confidence is achieved that proposed prices

145
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deliver improved profitability despite market
uncertainties, then the improvements attained are delivered despite market uncertainties.
Our findings support the hypothesis that
empty repositioning costs are externalities
to individual markets in this case study. We
found a high correlation between recommended price changes and MEC in each
market. Recommended price changes in
90% of the markets studied were positively
correlated with the introduced externality
cost for that market, MECGjk. The other 10%
of the markets experienced no recommended
change in price. The correlation holds true
regardless of direction of recommended price
change; 46% of the price changes were price
increases, 44% were price decreases. We
found no examples in which price moved in
the opposite direction of MEC. Similar
results were realized in our stylized example,
in which five out of six market prices moved
in the same direction as MEC, while the last
was unchanged.
Despite the strong correlation of the
change in price and MEC, we noted that the
size of the price changes was only 14% of the
MEC, which is a smaller ratio than initially
anticipated. Similarly, in the stylized example, the average ratio of price change to
MEC was only 5%. 'We hypothesize three
reasons for the small price changes. First, the
repositioning costs are, to some degree,
already considered in existing market prices;
the MEC is not an external cost in its entirety. Second, uncertainty in market parameters discourages more aggressive price
changes. Both in practice and in this model,
demand shifts can cause otherwise valid network-balancing prices to become undesirable. Third, the simple algorithm finds an
improvement less than the true optimum,
and prices change less than optimally given
MEC in each market.
Based on our results, there is a high level
of confidence that current prices produce
suboptimal profit levels, as is visible in Figure
4. Despite the introduction of a wide range
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of market fluctuations, in all applications
tested, the distribution of expected profit levels after optimization has almost a 95% confidence level that revised prices produce
improved market mix and network profitability. Across all markets studied, the
model proposed an average of a 2.94 percent
improvement in network wide profitability.
Profit improvements found by the model
were driven primarily by the reduction in
required repositioning after pricing modifications. In fact, direct market revenues and
profits both fall in every case examined, but
are more than offset by reduced repositioning. In one example (Gorman, 2001), a 3.5%
increase in network-wide profits was realized
through a 61% reduction in empty equipment repositioning costs. These gains could
only be realized by accepting a 1.4% reduction in revenue and a 4.1% reduction in
direct market profits. We observe this as further evidence that the focus tends to be on
optimal pricing based on the primary markets' costs and revenues, and that the repositioning costs are largely underrepresented
in pricing decisions.
These results also imply that the current
level of equipment repositioning in the transportation network studied is above optimal.
In every case examined, we found a 50-70%
reduction in repositioning with model recommended prices. By introducing MEC to
the pricing decision, the network-wide repositioning is drastically reduced. Reduced
repositioning frees up otherwise unproductive equipment time and makes it available
to provide additional revenue, effectively
expanding the fleets effectiveness and reducing shortages through a market mix that is
complementary with respect to equipment
utilization.
EXTENSIONS
In this analysis, we take a centralized view of
cost allocation and equipment repositioning
for the freight transportation carrier. We set
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Figure 4: Distribution of Projected Savings Based on Model Results
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a combination of market prices that strive for
network profitability given an externality.
The same efficiency gains could be realized
via a different mechanism: a market-based
approach to externality internalization. If liquid trading markets were devised for buying
and selling the rights to empty equipment at
the network nodes, prices for the equipment
would result that parallel the duals calculated
in TRC. By this method, instead of including
repositioning considerations while pricing in
the primary market, the freight transportation price may be split into two separate components: one for the direct shipment of the
goods, and one for the acquisition and disposal of the empty. In this way the pricing
decision in the primary transportation market is simplified to include only the direct factors of shipment; repositioning costs are handled in their own markets. These secondary
markets have the potential for removing the
task of allocating externality costs from the
primary markets by distributing them to secondary markets, thereby untangling the
equipment repositioning considerations from

the primary market pricing. The advantage to
this approach would be more responsive and
dynamic secondary market pricing for equipment repositioning. While the approach is
different, the implication would be the same:
the cost of empty repositioning must be fully
considered within the transportation
provider's market mix strategy.

CONCLUSION
We hypothesize equipment repositioning
costs are treated as an externality to the
freight transportation pricing decision. We
propose a methodology that allows us to
capture these externalities in the individual
market pricing decisions. Monte Carlo simulation accounts for marketplace demand and
price sensitivity uncertainties to produce a
robust solution in an applied setting. A simple heuristic generates objective function
improvement quickly despite the nondifferentiable, discontinuous nature of the objective function. The approach succeeds in
resolvil47ng empty equipment repositioning
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externalities and identifying market-pricing
opportunities in a case study in freight rail.
Our results confirmed our hypothesis; we
observed a strong positive correlation of
price change and externality when the cost
is introduced to the pricing decision. Further,
we observed almost a 95% confidence that

the level of net profits is increased through
our methodology. We concluded freight
transportation companies must take an optimal market mix perspective when establishing pricing policy rather than focusing on the
performnance of their individual products.
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